The Case of the Derogatory SnapChat
Two weeks ago, I had the great privilege to be a dayan, a judge, for a "moot beit din" competition sponsored by Ravsak, the association of North American Jewish day schools. High school students from across the US and Canada, and from across the spectrum of Jewish life and denominations, gathered together in Los Angeles to debate and interpret how Jewish law applies to the following case (somewhat abbreviated here in my paraphrase):
In the course of an election for student council at the Hebrew Academy High School, one of the candidates (Max) sent a SnapChat picture and message that used an insulting term for his opponent (Elizabeth) to the current president (Jonathan). Jonathan was disturbed by the SnapChat and took a screen shot of it. When Max texted Jonathan to ask why he took the screen shot (SnapChat users receive an automatic notice when their messages are saved in this way), Jonathan expressed his concerns about the inappropriate nature of the message, but Max wrote back that it was just a joke, and that he had only sent it to a few people. Unsatisfied with this response, Jonathan forwarded the screen shot in an e-mail to the school principle, Dr. Esti Davis, who then decided to suspend Max for three days.
The students had a number of issues to consider, such as: Is Max’ message excusable as just a joke? Did Jonathan have the right to save the SnapChat, and moreover, to share it with someone else, notably Dr. Davis? Under Jewish law, was the suspension a permissible, or the most appropriate, punishment Dr. Davis could have used to respond to Max’s act?
And here’s a question for you: what has this all to do with this week’s parashah(or really, parshiot)?
The answer, at least to my question to you, is that some of the key laws that undergird this case come from the second of this week’s two parshiot - in fact, from two verses that appear right next to each other in Leviticus 19:16 and 17:
16 Do not go about as a talebearer among your people; do not stand by the blood of your neighbor; I am the Lord.
17 Do not hate your brother in your heart; you shall surely rebuke your fellow; and you shall not bear sin on his account.
The first of these verses is one of several key sources for the rabbinic concept of "lashon ha-ra," evil speech, which is considered a great sin. More particularly, this verse is interpreted to refer to a very specific type of speech, one that might not seem so terrible at first glance - telling something true, when that truth might cast aspersions on another person. Thus Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:7 discusses what should - and shouldn’t - happen after a court case is decided:
From where (in Scripture do we learn) that when one of the judges comes out (from the hearing), he should not say "I declared (the defendant) innocent and my colleagues declared (him) guilty, but what can I do, since my colleagues outnumbered me?" About this (sort of statement) it is said, "Do not go about as a talebearer among your people" and it says, "One who goes about as a talebearer reveals secrets" (Proverbs 19:11).
From this, one of the great codifiers of rabbinic law, Maimonides, derives the following ruling in Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot De’ot 7:2:
Who is the "talebearer"? One who claims things and goes from this person to that one and says "This is what So-and-So said," "This is what I heard about So-and-So" - even though it is the truth, this person destroys the world; there is an exceedingly great sin in this...and it is (a form of) lashon ha-ra; for he speaks of the shame of his fellow even though he says the truth.
So... Is Jonathan a talebearer? To be sure, Max himself has committed an act of lashon ha-ra in his communication about Elizabeth (in his case, either what the rabbis call motzei shem ra, giving someone a bad name, and/or hamalbin p’nei havero, one who "whitens" - we would say reddens - the face of his fellow, i.e., embarrasses someone else publicly, as would have happened if and when Elizabeth learned of the SnapChat). Yet even, or especially, if that is the case then wouldn’t Jonathan’s telling someone else - even truthfully - what Max said/wrote, particularly with the intent of pointing out Max’s problematic behavior, fall under the definition of "talebearing" put forward by the Mishnah and by Maimonides?
But not so fast - what of the latter part of this verse: "do not stand by the blood of your neighbor"? From this the rabbis derived that one has an obligation to step when another person is threatened, and to attempt to avert the harm if one is able. Perhaps that was Jonathan’s intent - to prevent the harm that could come to Elizabeth from the negative effects of Max’s SnapChat, whether or not she found out about it. And there’s the next verse: "you shall surely rebuke your fellow." About this verse, the rabbis say in the Talmud, Arachin 16b:
From where (in Scripture do we learn) that one who sees an ugly thing (i.e., sinful or unethical behavior) in his fellow is obligated to rebuke him? Since it says, "you shall surely rebuke." (And from where do we know that) if he rebuked him and he did not accept it (the rebuke), that he must rebuke him again? As scripture states, "surely rebuke" - no matter what.
And yet even this ruling is immediately followed by this qualification:
Could it be (that one must rebuke) even if his face changes (i.e., pales or reddens in embarrassment)? As Scripture states, "you shall not bear sin on his account."
Do protect others from harm, do rebuke, do call out improper behavior - and yet do not embarrass someone else, even (or especially) with the truth...
How can Jonathan possibly respond to this situation in a halakhically valid manner?
It was at this point in the analysis of the problem that most (if not all) of the teams that my fellow judges and I were privileged to hear turned to the work of the late 19th/early 20th century writer Rabbi Yisroel Meir haKohen, better known as the Chafetz Chayim, after the title of his master work on the laws of lashon ha-ra (the title of which he took from Psalm 34:13-14: "Who is the person who desires life [ chafetz chayim]...Guard your tongue from wickedness, and your lips from speaking evil."). In his first chapter, the Chafetz Chayim reiterates Maimonides’ ruling that information conveyed by one person about another can be lashon ha-ra even when true. And yet, in successive chapters, he also takes a very realistic view about the times at which it may be necessary to convey negative information about another person. For example, if one of your acquaintances is considering hiring a new employee or going into a business partner, but you know that the potential employee or partner has previously been convicted of embezzlement, you are doing your acquaintance no favors in not sharing that information; their business could be at serious risk from the thief. Even so, for cases of these sorts, the Chafetz Chayim tries to create careful and thorough guidelines of what one may reveal, and how. Most relevant to our case of the derogatory SnapChat, in chapter 10 (paragraphs 1 and 2), the Chafetz Chayim introduces the idea of to’elet, speech that is indeed potential lashon ha-ra despite being true, but which is passed on from one person to another with the intent of righting a wrong. In this case, there are seven criteria that one must meet in order to share the information (and here I paraphrase rather than translate literally):
1) One must have seen the matter oneself; one may not report a rumor or second-hand information.
2) One must investigate the details of and circumstances surrounding the act to be absolutely certain that in fact a wrong was committed.
3) One must first rebuke the offending party in an appropriate manner, so that perhaps that person will repent without the matter having to become public.
4) One must not exaggerate the offense in any way.
5) One must examine one’s motives and be sure that one is acting only with intent to right the wrong.
6) There must be no other effective way to resolve the matter.
7) The offender should not receive a harsher punishment by virtue of the act being revealed than would have been the case had the offense been tried in a legitimate court.
Students thus had to examine carefully factors such as Jonathan’s actions before sending the e-mail to Dr. Davis, and the intent and the content of his e-mail, in order to decide if they thought he had met these criteria.
There is, of course, much, much more that could and should be (and already has been) said about all of the concepts that have been raised here: lashon ha-ra, rebuke, the tricky boundaries between harming one person and protecting another, etc. But for now I will just leave us with the wish that we might all become more attentive to our interactions with each other, striving for a measure, the same kind of rigorous analysis and thoughtfulness that the Chofetz Chayim - and the teens participating in the Moot Beit Din - brought to this essential aspect of human relations.
Shabbat shalom.